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1. INTRODUCTION
Auctions, when well designed, result in desirable economicout-
comes and have been widely used in solving real-world resource
allocation problems, and in structuring stock or futures exchanges.
The field of auction mechanism design has drawn much attention in
recent years from economists, mathematicians, and computer sci-
entists. In traditional auction theory, auctions are viewed as games
of incomplete information and traditional analytic methods from
game theory have been successfully applied to some simple tyes
of auctions. However, the assumption of prior common knowledge
in the incomplete information approach may not hold in some auc-
tions, and computing analytic solutions may be infeasible in other
auctions. Both of these problems hold in the case ofcontinuous
double auctions1.
As a result of these problems, researchers often use computer
simulation of auctions in which traders are software agents. Such
agents, armed with various learning algorithms and optimization
techniques, have been shown to produce outcomes similar to those
observed in auctions with human subjects [7]. Indeed, software
traders are capable of outperforming human traders [3]. Along
with the automation of traders, computer scientists have started to
take evolutionary and adaptive approaches to automatically reat-
ing auction mechanisms [1, 9, 10]. Although this work has pro-
duced promising results, it has one common theme — the only
comparisons that are made are indirect. The results from onelone
1A continuous double auction involves both buyers and and seller , and both kinds of
trader are allowed to make or accept an offer at time during the auction.
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Figure 1: The topology of aCAT game.
market are compared with those of another lone market. In contrast,
in real markets not only do traders in an auction compete against
each other, but real market institutions compete against each other.
In addition, existing work usually compares auction mechanisms
in different settings which vary according to the availability of in-
formation, computational resources, and so on. The conclusions of
these studies are thus difficult to compare and cumulate. It is there-
fore desirable to have a platform that allows multiple markets to
compete against each other, and allows market mechanisms tobe
evaluated in a uniform way. TheJCAT2 system that we introduce in
this paper addresses these concerns.
JCATextends the Java Auction Simulator API,JASA3 adding sup-
port for multiple parallel markets with trading agents moving be-
tween them. It has been used to conduct research on computational
auction design [8] and was successfully used as the game servr in
the first Trading Agent Competition (TAC) Market Design Compe-
tition (CAT) [5].4
2. WHAT JCAT PROVIDES
JCAT provides the ability to run what we will call “CAT games”,
each of which is an interaction between markets and traders.A
typical CAT game consists of aCAT server and severalCAT clients,
which may be trading agents or specialists (markets). As illu trated
in Figure 1, theCAT server works as a communication hub between
CAT clients. A registry component records all game events and
validates requests from traders and specialists. Various game report
modules are available to process game events, calculate andoutput







A CAT game lasts a certain number ofdays, each day consists
of rounds, and each round lasts a certain number ofticks, or mil-
liseconds. The game clock in the game server fires events to notify
clients of opening and closing of each day and round intervals.
Each trading agent is assigned private values for the goods it will
trade. For buyers the private value is the most it will pay fora good.
For sellers, the private value is the least it will accept fora good.
The private values and the number of goods to buy or sell make
up the demand and supply of the markets. Private values remain
constant during a day, but may change from day to day, depending
upon the configuration of the game server.
Each trading agent is endowed with atr ding strategyand amar-
ket selection strategy. The first specifies how to make offers, the
second specifies which market to choose to make offers in. Trading
strategies provided inJCAT include those that have been extensively
researched in the literature and some of them have shown to work
well in practice, e.g.,ZI-C [7], RE [4], ZIP [2], andGD [6]. A typi-
cal class of market selection strategies treats the choice of market as
ann-armed bandit problem where daily profits are used as rewards
when updating the value function.
Specialists facilitate trade by matching offers and determining
the trading price in an exchange market. Each specialist operates its
own exchange market and may choose its own auction rules — the
aim of theCAT competition is to create a specialist that optimizes a
particular set of measures [5]. Specialists may have adaptive strate-
gies such that the policies change during the course of a gamein
response to market conditions for desired outcomes.JCAT provides
a reference implementation of a parameterizable specialist that can
be easily configured and extended to use policies regulatingdiffer-
ent aspects of an auction.
A specialist typically includes components that regulate aspects
of its market. The following components were common in entrants
to the firstCAT competition [8].Matching policiesdefine the set of
matching offers in a market at a given time.Quoting policiesde-
termine the ask quote and bid quote, which respectively specify the
upper bound for offers to sell and the lower bound for offers to buy
that may be placed in the market at a given time.Shout accepting
policiesjudge whether a request by a trader to place an offer in the
market should be accepted or rejected.Clearing conditionsdefine
when to clear the market and execute transactions between matched
offers. A pricing policy is responsible for determining transaction
prices for matched ask-bid pairs. The decision may involve only the
prices of the matched offers, or more information includingmarket
quotes. Charging policiesdetermine the charges a specialist im-
poses on a trading day. A specialist can set its fees, orprice list,
which are charged to traders and other specialists who wish to use
the services provided by the specialist. Each specialist isfree to set
the level of the charges for registration with a specialist,for making
an offer, for completing a transaction, and so on.
3. IMPLEMENTATION
JCAT is written in Java, and adopts a client/server scheme for
high flexibility and scalability. Its socket-based communicat on and
the use of a plain-text message language (CATP) permits clients
to be written in virtually any popular programming language, and
CAT games can run across the Internet as in the 2007TAC CAT
competition.
TheJCAT class library provides an extensible framework in which
new auction rules can be easily implemented and coupled with
other policies. A variety of learning algorithms have been included
to support adaptive strategies.JCAT has a user-friendly interface
based on Java Swing to monitor an on-going game, and also sup-
ports aPHP interface allowing results to be displayed on the Web.
4. MARKET DESIGN COMPETITION
JCAT was successfully used as the game server during the first
TAC CAT Competition, held in July 2007 at theAAAI conference.
PriorTAC competitions featured competing trading agents that aimed
to maximize their payoffs by interacting in a single market.The
TAC CAT competition did just the opposite. Each entrant in the
competition provided a specialist, and these specialists competed
against each other for market share, profits (by levying feeson
traders), and maintaining a high transaction success rate.Traders in
CAT games were provided by the competition organizers. The Mar-
ket Design Competition, which will run atAAAI again this year,
provides an ideal testbed for modeling competition among market
institutions, comparing different auction mechanisms, and evaluat-
ing them in a uniform way.
In future iterations, aCAT game may have both traders and spe-
cialists submitted by entrants and two competitions, one for traders
and the other for markets, thus coupled together. This wouldmore
closely simulate the real world where both traders and markets
adapt quickly and effectively to either the changes of theircom-
petitors or those of potential business partners to achievetheir eco-
nomic goals.
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